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COMMENT ON BAKER’S AUTONOMY AND
FREE SPEECH
T.M. Scanlon*
In approaching this comment I am conflicted in two ways.
First, I have always been a great admirer of Ed Baker and his
work, but I will be focusing mostly on those points on which we
disagreed. Second, my relation to the autonomy theories of
freedom of speech is ambiguous. I agree with Ed Baker in taking
autonomy theories to be superior to democracy-based accounts,
which are their main systemic rival, and I myself once offered a
theory of freedom of expression that gave a central place to
autonomy. But I have come to believe that theory to be
mistaken in important respects, and, more generally, to believe,
for reasons that I will explain, that the concept of autonomy is
not a helpful one.
The idea that there is a right of freedom of speech depends
on the belief that important interests are threatened if the state
has unregulated power to restrict expression. The interests in
question are, on the surface at least, various. Some of these
interests are political in the sense of having to do with elections,
legislation and so forth. These include, at least, the interests of
participants’ expression in having opportunities to criticize
public officials, to influence public policy and legislation, and to
participate in electoral politics. Beyond these narrowly political
interests, people also have interests in having opportunities to
communicate with others who share their values having to do
with art, religion, science, philosophy, sex and other important
aspects of personal life, and in having opportunities to express
these values to others who may not share them, in hopes of
influencing them, and thereby shaping the mores of their society,
or just in order to bear witness to these values by giving them
public expression. People also have interests, as audience
members, in having access to information and opinion and to
* Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity,
Harvard University.
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expression by others on all the subjects I have listed. Finally,
people have interests, as third parties, in having the political,
economic, and social benefits of a society in which our fellow
citizens’ participant and audience interests are fulfilled.
One central task of theoretical reflection on freedom of
speech is that of clarifying these interests: understanding what
they are, why they are important, and in what ways they are at
stake when restrictions on expression are in question. Two types
of theories offer systematic characterizations of these interests.
Democracy-based theories identify the interests at stake in
freedom of expression as based in the preconditions of
democratic government, or in the conditions required for us to
fulfill our roles as citizens. Autonomy-based theories identify
these interests as reflecting the value of individual autonomy,
and see the right of freedom of speech as something required by
respect for autonomy.
Systematic accounts offer two possible advantages. First,
they may provide a more secure foundation for freedom of
speech by grounding the interests in question in a single value
that it is more difficult to doubt or deny. Second, by providing a
unified account of these apparently diverse interests they may
provide a clearer understanding of their nature and importance,
which may provide guidance in cases in which they need to be
balanced against one another or against other concerns.
Democracy-based theories in particular can seem appealing
for the first of these reasons. By grounding the restrictions on
majority rule that a right of freedom of expression involves in
the conditions of legitimacy of the democratic process itself, they
counter the objection that these restrictions are illegitimate
because they are “counter-majoritarian.” I agree with Ed
Baker’s conclusion that, despite this appeal, democracy-based
theories cannot account for the full range of expressive activities
protected by freedom of speech. The requirements of
democratic rule comprise one important class of interests
protected by freedom of speech. But they are not the whole
1
story. An autonomy-based theory does much better in this
regard. All, or at least almost all, of the interests I listed above as
being at stake in freedom of speech could plausibly be called
interests in autonomy. So in that respect the position I want to
defend could be called an autonomy-based theory, in contrast to
1. See Ed Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 270 n.28
(2011).
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a democracy-based theory. Such a theory—one based simply on
the importance of protecting and advancing these interests—
would, if I understand him correctly, be what Baker calls a
2
substantive autonomy theory. Calling all of these diverse
interests matters of autonomy strikes me as not very helpful.
But Baker’s use of this term goes beyond this labeling of
interests. The formal autonomy theory he advocates holds that
although “promoting substantive autonomy, along with matters
of collective self-definition, should be a major aim of the state
and the legal order,” the “pursuit of this and other state aims
should only use means that respect a more formal conception of
3
autonomy of each person.” This formal conception of autonomy
“consists of a person’s authority (or right) to make decisions
about herself—her own meaningful actions and usually her use
of her resources—as long as her actions do not block others’
4
similar authority or rights.” The requirement to respect formal
autonomy thus operates as a “side constraint” on governmental
5
policies aimed to promote substantive autonomy or other goods.
When does a government policy fail to respect formal
autonomy? The most obvious examples would be cases of
attempted “thought control” in which governments attempt to
interfere with individuals’ thought processes. The requirement of
respect that Baker has in mind would rule out such
interventions, but it would also demand more. Autonomy as he
understands it includes not only exercising the capacity for
making up one’s own mind but also “self-expressive rights that
include, for example, a right to seek to persuade or unite or
associate with others—or to offend, expose, condemn, or
6
disassociate with them.” Expressive activities count as exercises
of formal autonomy, however, only if they involve the honest
representation of what the speaker believes to be true. Lies and
threats are thus excluded.
So not every policy that limits expressive activities
disrespects formal autonomy. Expressive activities can be
restricted (without disrespecting formal autonomy), Baker says,
when these activities would otherwise interfere with the formal
autonomy of others. “Generally,” he says, “respect for autonomy involves respect for a person’s choices about herself and,
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 272.
Id. at 253–54 (emphasis added).
Id. at 254.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 254.
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maybe, her resources up until her choice involves taking choice
7
away from another about himself or his resources.” Expressive
activities are not purely “self-regarding.” They can affect others
and can make them worse off. It matters, however, in what way
these harms occur. One person’s speech cannot be restricted on
the ground that it harms others by persuading them of things
that are false or bad, but can be restricted on other grounds, such
8
as when it involves threats, coercion or violence.
The common thread here is that government disrespects the
formal autonomy of its citizens when it substitutes its judgment
for their own and restricts expression on this basis. When
government restricts a person’s speech on grounds other than its
effect on others, it is doing so on what it judges to be the merits
of the thoughts expressed, and is thus failing to respect the
judgment, and hence the formal autonomy, of the speaker.
When it restricts speech on the ground that it harms others by
persuading them to adopt mistaken attitudes, government fails
to respect the judgment, hence the formal autonomy, of those
who are so affected.
I myself once proposed a theory of freedom of expression
that had as its centerpiece a similar autonomy-based side
constraint on the harms that can justify the regulation of
9
expression. I later rejected this theory because this restriction
seemed to me too tight. It fails to distinguish between
restrictions on political speech, justified by the alleged fact that it
would lead citizens to form mistaken views about the wisdom of
governmental policies, and restrictions on cigarette advertising,
10
or false and misleading advertising for other products. All of
these justifications involve an element of “substituted
judgment,” but they are not all illegitimate.
In order to determine which are and which are not
legitimate, we need to take into account the various interests
that individuals have in the forms of expression and kinds of
information in question, and the degree to which these interests
11
would be threatened by government regulation. In the case of
7. Id. at 257–58.
8. Id.
9. See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
204, 213–15 (1972), reprinted in T.M. SCANLON, THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE 6, 14–
15 (2003).
10. See T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40
U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 534 (1979), reprinted in THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE, supra
note 9, at 84.
11. The same is true of paternalistic legislation restricting behavior other than
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allegedly false or misleading expression regarding political
issues, individuals’ interests, both as potential speakers and
potential audiences, are very significant, and the danger is great
that the power to regulate expression on these grounds, if it were
granted, would be misused in a partisan way that would damage
these interests. On the other hand, the interests of sellers of
goods in having greater opportunities to influence potential
12
buyers are less urgent. The interest of buyers in the information
they may get from advertising varies from case to case, and is in
some cases not insignificant, although not as urgent as
comparable interests in political speech. And, finally, there is
less reason than in the case of political speech to believe that
governmental powers to ban false and misleading commercial
advertising would be overused in ways that would threaten these
interests. Not that there is no reason to be concerned about
regulation in this case, but certainly there is less reason.
It is instructive to compare this approach to commercial
speech, based on calculations about what is required to protect
interests in what Baker calls substantive autonomy, with Baker’s
more wholesale account, based on formal autonomy. On the
speakers’ side, Baker says that when legally constituted business
entities engage in communication, “the moral/constitutional
autonomy-based justification for protecting speech of flesh and
13
blood people is simply not at stake here.” This seems to me
correct, although I would put the point in terms of interests. The
function of free speech principles is to protect the interests of
individuals, as potential speakers, audiences and bystanders, and
the relevant speaker-related interests are not at issue in
commercial speech.
But there are also audience interests to be considered. On
this side, Baker writes, “The instrumental value that a listener
places in her responsiveness to the persuasiveness of commercial
speech or a gun to her head contrasts to the substantive or
expression. Such legislation always involves an element of substituted judgment, but it is
not for that reason always objectionable. Whether it is objectionable depends on the
reasons individuals have for wanting certain aspects of their lives to depend on the
choices they make under certain conditions, and the costs, including symbolic costs, of
having these choices made by others. For more detailed discussion see T.M. SCANLON,
WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 251–56 (1998).
12. In saying that these interests are “less urgent” I mean that they have less
justificatory weight in determining what laws or policies are justified. This is not to deny
that some people may in fact care more about what they buy than about whether they
can vote. See T.M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655, 655–69 (1975),
reprinted in THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE, supra note 9, at 70–83.
13. Baker, supra note 1, at 273.
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solidarity value a listener places in her response to a solicitation
for contribution. In second circumstance, but not the first, the
listener comes to value the recipient having that with which she
parts. And the speaker in the charitable solicitation seeks to
persuade the listener on agreement in values while in the
commercial speech or gun case only seeks behavior that the
listener now instrumentally values because of how the speaker
14
has changed her options.” This seems to me overly broad.
Whatever the motives of advertisers may be, consumers do have
reason to value information that they receive from advertising,
about relative prices, technical details of products, and matters
of style and fashion. These audience interests can be enhanced
by regulation that makes this information more reliable (such as
laws against false and misleading advertising) but they can also
be threatened by over-regulation (such as outright bans on
advertising, enacted at the behest of companies with dominant
market share). So, while commercial speech differs from political
speech in important ways, audience interests of the kind that
freedom of speech is designed to protect are still in play.
If, then, I could be called an autonomy theorist, this is
because the interests that I take to lie at the heart of freedom of
speech might all be called interests in substantive autonomy.
This label does not, however, seem to me helpful, particularly
because it is important to recognize the diversity of the interests
in question.
Bringing all of these interests under the general category of
autonomy might, however, seem to offer an advantage of the
first kind I mentioned at the beginning of this comment, the
advantage of providing those interests with a secure normative
foundation. If we cannot help seeing ourselves as autonomous—
as making up our own minds what to think—then we might seem
to be committed to the conditions required for us to do this, and
hence to requirements of freedom of expression.
But even if the premise of this argument is accepted, it
delivers less than might appear. It is true that we cannot avoid
making up our own minds what to think, on whatever evidence is
available to us that we deem relevant. Even in taking someone
else’s word for a matter, we are making up our own minds in this
sense, by deciding to take that person’s word for it. But as this
example illustrates, even if we are committed to our own
autonomy in this sense, nothing follows about how much we
14. Id. at 273–74.
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should be prepared to give up in order to put ourselves in a
better position to make up our minds about any particular
question. The answer to this, as I have argued in my comment on
Seana Shiffrin’s paper, depends on the subject matter in
question.
So the best account of freedom of speech seems to me to be
neither democracy-based, nor autonomy-based, but irreducibly
pluralist.

